Kim Davis, Same-Sex "Marriage," and Irrationality on Parade

Kim Davis is the clerk for Rowan County, Kentucky (at least as of this writing). She was the deputy clerk for ~26 years. In 2014 she ran for the position of clerk as a democrat and was elected, her term beginning January 2015.

Marriage was historically defined and practiced in Kentucky as being between a man and woman only, both by the legislature and by popular vote -- this was even incorporated into the state's constitution. Apparently no marriage licenses were issued to any same-sex couples by any Kentucky county in the entire history of the state. In 2013 and 2014 two suits were brought against Kentucky, attempting to force it and its residents to recognize and support same-sex marriage (SSM). Though these had some initial success, both were overturned in favor of the prior, default position.

In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that SSM is protected under the federal Constitution of the United States. The fall-out in various states was a proliferation of laws making it such that one could not legally discriminate on the provision of goods or services on the basis of sexual orientation. Any person who did so might face dire consequences. What this means is that, if you offer a good or service to the public, you could not lawfully deny that same good or service to someone on the basis that he or she was homosexual. Many persons and agencies do not agree with the ruling, and do not believe that they can be rightly compelled to act in a way that violates their conscience, morals or religious beliefs. Such persons would be subject to a variety of possible penalties, though, for acting in a way that singled out homosexuals, at least in places where actual laws had been created that compelled such behavior. In a somewhat clever move, and to avoid being accused of discrimination, Davis' office in Rowan County stopped providing marriage licenses not just to same-sex couples, but to everyone. Several offices, judges and other public and private parties have made similar choices.

Obviously, this does not and did not prevent people from getting married, and nor can it be rightly claimed that it was illegal discrimination. All it stopped was county/state sanction (at least by Rowan County) of that union -- an act that is arguably superfluous in the first place. People seeking state recognition/sanction of their marriage (homosexual or heterosexual) could acquire this from many of the nearby counties, most of which are about a 15-to-30-minute drive away. (Of course, the obvious solution is for the state to get its nose out of the marriage business altogether and simply state that it will recognize any marriage otherwise performed -- the underlying problem, as is often the case, is the state's involvement in the first place.)

In response to Davis' move, the ACLU sued Davis and the county in federal court, arguing that she was violating citizens' rights so recently discovered in the federal constitution by SCOTUS. A federal district court ruled that Davis must offer licenses to homosexual couples. She refused to comply with the order, and was then fined and jailed for refusing to follow the court's order.

And then everyone lost their minds. Well, they were already pretty much gone. What this did was provide an opportunity for people to parade their lack of rationality for all to see... and cheer.

Davis' life was laid bare and dissected in the public square. She has been portrayed as physically repugnant, a hypocrite and a Christian fanatic who is attempting to impose her crazy, backward fundamentalist beliefs on others. She is practically a terrorist. But what is the reality? Here are some of the arguments, open and implied, that have been made:

If she didn't like it, why did she issue licenses before?

This is easily answered, and is clear to anyone interested in the truth. The prior stance for all of the state's history had been to issue only heterosexual marriage certificates. As these did not violate her personal, religious beliefs, she issued these papers.

She is unattractive.

This is, along with "you're dumb," the favorite response of those who have no better argument. This is the classic ad hominem fallacy, making the issue about some trait or characteristic of the person rather than focussing on the actual issue or facts.

It is interesting that, out of the probably-thousands of persons who are taking a similar stand, the media has chosen to focus on Davis. This is likely not an accident, but designed to associate a stance against SSM with being portrayed as an unattractive, somewhat-looney hypocrite. Speaking of which....

She is a hypocrite who has been divorced and remarried.

Various sources suggest that Davis is presently in her fourth marriage. Her last divorce was in 2008. Sometime around 2011 she apparently became involved in Apostolic Christianity -- the particular church is unclear. While the denomination discourages divorce, it doesn't appear to flatly forbid it. Same-sex marriage, however, is flatly forbidden.

Because Davis' divorces took place prior to her participation in the Apostolic Christian Church (and divorce is discouraged, not forbidden), the assertion of hypocrisy simply doesn't stick. We all change our beliefs over time, and it is entirely possible -- and the history seems to suggest -- that Davis had just such a change. Either way, there is a substantial difference between divorce and SSM, let alone actual homosexual behavior. One of these things is not like the other. To equate them is absurd.

Similar to trying to subtly incorporate Davis' appearance into the discussion, this smear of hypocrisy involving prior divorces is just another manifestation of an ad hominem fallacy, designed to confuse the discussion.

She is imposing her religious beliefs on others.

This is clearly false. Davis' action does not prevent any same-sex couple from getting married. Indeed, the reality is just the opposite (and reminiscent of Marx's instruction to "accuse others of what you do"). Specifically, the SSM proponents are attempting to force Davis to publicly endorse something which she opposes as a matter of religion and personal conscience. That is, they are attempting to impose their beliefs upon her, to force her to reject her religious beliefs and adopt the beliefs of the SSM proponents.

It is her job. If she doesn't want to do it, she should quit.

This actually isn't true. The job she ran and was elected for did not include issuing marriage licenses to homosexual couples. Certain people have attempted to use the government and legal system to force her to do so (or force her out of her career) after-the-fact.

The Real Issue

The essence of the question is whether any person can be rightly forced to positively provide a good or service to another person.

The answer, of course, is no.

We might tell such a person, "I really think that you should," or "I won't be your friend if you don't," but what we have no right to do is to threaten them with harm. To claim that someone must provide a good or service to another person against his will is to assert that he is a kind of slave who must do as we command... or else.

At last check, Davis offered to allow the certificates to be issued from her office, as long as she was not required to sign her name to them, indicating her personal endorsement.

Are there Moral Absolutes? Why Logic Matters... and sometimes Hurts!

I received a letter from a student requesting help on an ethical debate taking place in his college philosophy class. The debate was about whether morals are "absolute" in the sense of being universally mandatory for everyone irrespective of the circumstances. The asserted position was "no, they aren't," and the discussion went from there into a concept called the "Doctrine of Double Effect."

The ultimate question in any such issue is whether the assertion can be justified as true (or at least probable). "Justification" involves either rational/logical proof and/or demonstration. This is what is being asked for when someone responds to an assertion by saying "prove it!" 

Suppose you have a friend named Socrates and someone has claimed that Socrates is immortal. His mortality could be proven (or demonstrated or justified) empirically by poisoning him -- which is, ironically, what actually happened -- or simply waiting for him to die naturally. 

"See, I told you he was mortal. Pay up loser."

Empirical demonstration is only one of many kinds of justification or "proofs." Indeed, many things that are perfectly true can't be proven empirically (or, in some cases, at all); what you ate for lunch last week, that your mother loves you, etc. These depend on different kinds of proofs. In philosophy, a powerful kind of proof is simply called an argument.

An argument is a series of related claims intended to justify or "prove" the initial assertion. For example, rather than killing Socrates, someone might argue that he is mortal as follows:

Premise 1: All men are mortal.
Premise 2: Socrates is a man.
Conclusion: Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

This kind of argument is called a syllogism. A syllogism is a structured group of three statements. Two of the statements are called premises. These (ideally) support and prove the third statement, called the conclusion. That conclusion is usually the initial belief in dispute. (Many arguments have more premises, or are layered syllogisms, but for this post we'll keep it simple.)

If one wants to untangle and make any sense of common disputes (or otherwise drive himself and those nearby insane) it is important to learn to restructure assertions as syllogisms so that they can be analyzed. It is a little bit like transforming a story problem into a mathematical equation for solving. The difference is that we are attempting to discern the rational, logic structure underlying the thinking. This is what you would (or should) be taught in a decent critical thinking or logic class, but it is a practice that takes many years of development.

To discern whether an argument succeeds in proving the truth of an assertion, we need to examine it in three dimensions, so-to-speak:

• Are the terms of the argument clear?
• Are the premises true?
• Is the logical structure -- the relationship between the premises -- valid?

If the answer to all three of these questions is yes, then the argument is called "sound" and the conclusion should be accepted as true. If the answer to any of these is no, then the argument is "unsound," and the truth of the conclusion is, at best, uncertain. (A common mistake is to assume that, there being a problem in the argument, the conclusion is false. That is an error. The argument does not determine the truth of the conclusion. It merely demonstrates or justifies it. The conclusion might be true even if the argument is a train wreck.) 

So we need to look at the general structure of the argument, and the meaning of the premises. In our sample argument, the terms are clear and being used in unequivocal ways. These terms are Socrates, man/men and mortal. The premises are true and share the middle term man/men. The premises and their terms are properly structured and related with the conclusion. This indicates that the conclusion is true, has been demonstrated or justified; it therefore can be said to be known (as opposed to merely believed, as in a subjective opinion). 

Here is an example in which terms are being used equivocally:

Dogs have fleas.
James is sometimes a real dog.
James has fleas (at least sometimes).

In this case, the word "dog" is being used in two different senses. In the first premise it refers to actual dogs. In the second premise it refers to James' appearance or behavior. Unclear, equivocal terms are really common in arguments. The presence of such dynamics renders an argument "unsound" and the conclusion unjustified (though not necessarily false).

When we ask whether an argument is valid, we are asking whether the relationship between the terms, premises and conclusion is rational. For example, this argument is invalid:

All students have backpacks.
James has a backpack.
Therefore, James is a student.

Even if all of the claims in the above argument were true -- even if James is, in fact, a student -- the argument is still invalid because it doesn't actually justify or prove the conclusion. Specifically, James could have a backpack and yet not be a student. Any argument that is invalid is also unsound. Calling it invalid is merely specifying the way in which it is unsound. There is much more that can and probably should be said here, but let us move on, lest this become a mini-course in logic.

Let's look at the real question now. The philosophy student provided the following syllogism from his text and class discussion:

P1. If there are any absolute moral rules, then we are never permitted to break them.
P2. Every moral rule may permissibly be broken, since doing so may be necessary to prevent a catastrophe.
C: Therefore, there are no absolute moral rules.

We are immediately faced with a bit of a problem because the first premise is phrased in an if-then format. There is nothing wrong with the if-then format in and of itself -- we frequently think in such modes, and many modern logic texts use it as opposed to more classical modes. The if-then format is generally applied to three situations; sufficient cause, necessary cause, and identity. The difference between these is critical to this discussion and the student's confusion.

Consider the statement, "If Romeo loves Juliette then Romeo will place Juliette's needs ahead of his own." This is saying that Romeo's love of Juliette is a sufficient cause of her needs being placed first. Circumstance A will bring about or is a cause for circumstance B (but B might take place without A). If incorporated into a complete (and trivial) argument structured so as to mirror the student's ethical argument, it might be written as follows:

Premise 1: If Romeo loves Juliette, then Romeo will place Juliette's needs ahead of his own.
Premise 2: Romeo does not place Juliette's needs ahead of his own.
Conclusion: Romeo does not love Juliette.

The symbolic representation is:

P → Q
~ Q
∴ ~ P

Where P and Q stand for terms in the premises. In English this is:

If P then Q
Not Q
Therefore not P

(Some people, especially those with computer programming or mathematics backgrounds, often prefer to use ! to represent "not" or negation. However, ~ is the customary symbol for "not" in symbolic logic.) Referring back to our prior comments about terms, premises and validity, such an argument is perfectly valid no matter what nonsense is inserted for P and Q, but it is only sound if there is a corresponding relationship between P and Q. For example, imagine that someone wanted to argue that dogs do not have fleas, and to do so, he provided the following argument:

If dogs have fleas then elephants are purple.
Elephants are not purple.
Therefore, dogs do not have fleas.

This argument is valid, but unsound. What this means is that there is a problem in the premises. This does not prove that the conclusion to an argument is false (though that is the case here), but only that the conclusion has not been successfully proven or justified. Whether it is actually true remains unclear, barring other justification.

Understanding the relationship between the premises and the terms within the premises is critical to discerning the validity and soundness of an argument.

In the argument in question, premise one is neither an assertion of sufficient nor necessary cause and effect. Rather, it is what is called a definition, identity or tautology: An absolute moral is a moral that, by definition, no one is permitted to violate under any circumstance. This is worth noting because it is unusual to include definitions as explicit premises and affects the overall argument. Consider this argument:

If something exists, then it is real.
God is not real.
Therefore, God does not exist.

This is a perfectly valid argument -- its structure is correct -- but whether it is sound and its conclusion is true is another matter. If someone is arguing that God does not exist, he might make an argument like this (among others). But think about this for a moment. The problem should be apparent to the Astute Reader; because the first premise is a definition and not a causal relationship, the terms are interchangeable. Saying "something exists" is the same as saying "it is real." One does not cause the other in the sense of cause and effect. This means that there is no difference between writing the second premise as "God is not real," and "God does not exist." This being the case, the argument's proponent has thereby smuggled the conclusion of the argument into the premises. However, this is obscured due to the way the argument has been structured. When pressed, this argument is really little more than:

God does not exist.
Therefore, God does not exist.

This is just an assertion, and not an argument at all. It has no demonstrative or justifying value. Many disagreements are hardly as substantive as this.

This a common reasoning error -- so common that there is a name specifically for it: Begging the Question. This means that the argument fails to justify or demonstrate the conclusion because the conclusion has actually been explicitly incorporated into the premises. The reason that this argument is "guilty" of this is because it employed a tautology for its first premise.

This is the primary problem in the argument in question, but may still seem unclear to the untrained or inexperienced reader. For clarification, let's contrast it with proper, conventional employment of the if-then structure -- a sufficient or necessary causal relationship as opposed to a tautology.

If Joe gets hit by a car traveling 30 mph, then he will sustain injuries.
Joe did not experience injuries.
Therefore, Joe did not get hit by a car traveling 30 mph.

In this argument, sustaining injuries is the result of -- not the same as -- getting hit by a car. Another way of saying this is that getting hit by a car is a sufficient cause of sustaining injuries. To say that something is a sufficient cause is to say that it can bring about the effect in question, but the effect can also come about by other means. We know that this is not a tautology because the terms "sustain injuries" and "gets hit by a car" are not interchangeable without changing the meaning of the sentence; they are two different things. Here is another example:

If Joe survived the year, then he received food and water.
Joe did not receive food and water.
Therefore, Joe did not survive.

This one is a little awkward, but the point is that the food and water are necessary causes for survival. They are necessary in the sense that, in their absence, the effect does not and cannot occur. Again, we know this is not a tautology because "surviving" and "receiving food and water," though they may be related, are not interchangeable. They are two different things. When we state premise 2, that Joe did not receive food and water, we are not saying that Joe didn't survive -- we are saying that he didn't receive the things that are necessary for survival.

When we look back at the original argument, we can see that P1 is a tautology:

P1. If there are any absolute moral rules, then we are never permitted to break them.
P2. Every moral rule may permissibly be broken, since doing so may be necessary to prevent a catastrophe.
C: Therefore, there are no absolute moral rules.

That is, being never permitted to break a rule isn't the cause or effect of an absolute rule, but its very definition. It isn't that A leads to or causes B. A is B. We could reverse the terms and have the very same meaning to the sentence and subsequent argument:

P1. If we are never permitted to break a moral rule, then it is an absolute moral rule.
P2. Every moral rule may permissibly be broken, since doing so may be necessary to prevent a catastrophe.
C: Therefore, there are no absolute moral rules.

Ironically, this form is actually a little more intuitively clear. But, either way, the fundamental problem remains that the argument, itself, is little more than an assertion that there are no absolute moral rules (because every rule may be broken in an emergency). But this proves nothing, because saying "there are no absolute moral rules," and saying "every [or any] moral rule may be broken" is to say the same thing. This means that the argument fails by way of begging the question -- having its conclusion clearly, overtly present in a premise.

Self-Contradiction

Now, this kind of analysis requires formation that very few people receive. Even if and when received, it requires substantial practice to develop. There is a simpler way to recognize whether arguments of this nature are sound, which is to ask whether they contradict themselves.

Any moral rule is a claim that we ought (or ought not) do or believe something. This argument claims that we ought to believe that there are no absolute morals. This is a moral claim... an absolute one! This is the classic "Achilles Heel" of the moral relativist position -- it is an absolute claim that there are no absolutes. It contradicts itself both here, but also in an even more subtle way. Specifically, it is a moral claim/rule which states that every moral rule is subject to exceptions. If applied to itself, this means that there simultaneously are no absolute moral rules, and yet there must be exceptions to this, which means that there are absolute moral rules. This is a violation of one of the most fundamental principles of logic (and reality), called the principle of non-contradiction. The principle of non-contradiction asserts that something cannot both be and not be in the same way and at the same time.

Indeed, with a little thought a clever person will recognize that, if there is any such thing as morality, then the principle of non-contradiction (if it is true) actually necessitates that there are moral absolutes. The alternative position, that there aren't any moral absolutes, distills down to nonsense. Of course, discerning precisely what those absolutes are is another matter.

In the end, the fundamental mistake is to accept this argument at all and then try to fabricate ways (e.g., the doctrine of double effect) to work around it. You usually end up with something even messier and more compromised than the original position.

"But I don't care"

The real problem in matters like this is that, in the end, the person making the argument very rarely cares whether his argument is actually sound. He believes the conclusion irrespective of whether it is actually justified, and he thinks that you should too (and that you are stupid if you don't). Attitudes like this generally result in "anything goes" situations -- e.g., bad arguments, appeals to emotion, name calling, even threats or assaults. On the other hand, some people might respond dismissively by saying, "well, who can really know?"

In the last few days I allowed myself to be drawn into an unpleasant debate with someone named Jason Caryl. The provocateur posted a rather grotesque video of (apparently) Muslim men stomping, kicking and ultimately stoning to death a teenage girl. The text he wrote to label the video read, "This is what Jesus says to do to little girls [....] Still love Jesus?" (I have edited his comment and his responses, below, to keep this post at a PG level.) With a little more looking I discovered that Jason is an enthusiastic atheist, with a particular animosity toward Christianity.

I left a public message for him asking if he had any evidence to support his claim (1) that Jesus instructs people to stone little girls, and (2) that it had anything to do with the video he posted. I added that I was only aware of one recorded instance in which Jesus was present at an attempted stoning (Matthew 8). In that event, Jesus stopped the stoning and saw that the woman went free. Indeed, I can think of no instance in which Jesus condoned violence of any kind (with the exception of his own clearing of the bankers from the temple).

Jason responded quickly with "You only expose your ignorance. You are fools who cannot see your own sickness. [....] You should be ashamed, but you are so indoctrinated that evil seems good to you." All of this from asking him a question. Hmm. I pointed out that name calling isn't really helpful, and it would be good to stay on task. Again, could he provide any evidence to support his assertion?

He responded with about six different Bible verses, almost all from the Old Testament, few of which had anything to do with stoning, and none had anything to do with Jesus... plus now I'm a "mind slave." I'm not quite sure what that is, but I pointed out that none of verses he supplied actually showed Jesus telling people to stone little girls.

He responded with mock wonder about how I was unable to understand the Bible. More name calling. And so on.

After a few exchanges, especially if progress has stopped, I often find it useful to make a "the story thus far" post. In this post I wrote as follows:

I just want to make sure I understand this Jason. You began by posting a horrific video, the genesis of which is unclear, but appears to be Muslims stoning a young woman to death. You then wrote that Jesus supports this act, and the stoning of little girls. When asked to provide evidence for your assertion, you responded with a variety of texts from the Bible, none of which were written by Jesus, record anything that he said or did, or were apparently supported by him.

When pressed on these, you now say that the evidence supporting your claim is a passage from Deuteronomy 22 that:

1) Also was not written by Jesus.
2) Doesn't record anything that Jesus said or did.
3) Was never cited by Jesus.
4) Doesn't mention Jesus.
5) Was probably written 700-1400 years before Jesus' birth.

Further, you ignore the fact that, when people actually did try to stone someone in Jesus' presence, he opposed the stoning and set the woman free.

Do I have this about right?

That seemed to push ol' Jason over the edge, and the names began to fly. Shortly thereafter I mentioned that I actually hold master's degrees in philosophy and theology, am rather familiar with the Bible, debate, etc. At that point Jason could no longer credibly continue his ploy that I was simply stupid, so he switched to calling me a "moral cesspool."

I mention this because we need to realize that many times the beliefs that we and others hold lack a demonstrable rational basis. Many of these may nonetheless be true, but many are not, and are rooted in life-long social conditioning, emotion, hurt, confusion, even psychological disorders. When someone asserts something that is offensive and obviously false, even if you ask them about it in the nicest possible way -- simply asking them if they have any justification for that belief -- you may need to brace yourself and have a fairly thick skin. You might hit a nerve. At the very least, be prepared to be called stupid or evil or worse, perhaps in a very public forum. This is what people do when they begin to realize that they have no justifications for the nonsense that they've been spouting or living -- they attack you instead. Remember what happened to Socrates....

Because of this (and because few of us really know how), many people don't or are afraid to try to actually reason with others. They think it is fruitless or a waste of time, or even dangerous... and sometimes it is. Calmly expressing your own beliefs in a rational way, or asking people questions about theirs can end relationships. For example, my own father-in-law of 24 years has refused to even speak to me for the last three or so. He won't say why. Perhaps it is just a coincidence, but all communication ceased after Thanksgiving a few years ago when a dinner guest asked me why I stopped voting. I explained that, after much reflection, I came to see that voting was materially an attempt to impose my will upon others under the threat of violence (via the government), and that I just couldn't continue to do so in good conscience. Conversation continued amicably from there, but Loren hasn't spoken to me since except in grunts, and a rare full sentence in which he explained to me that "we'll never be friends." It does make for interesting holidays.

Having and articulating a philosophy, even an almost completely non-violent, non-aggressive one like my own, can have quite unforeseen effects on your relationships. Asking questions can do the same.

But I digress. The reality is that even if I didn't get through to Jason right now, I sometimes engage in such discussions because (1) I don't know everything and might be wrong, and (2) if I'm right, perhaps it will plant a seed that could grow into something good later. Further, someone else might come upon the discussion and it might help them. Or maybe it won't. The truth is that I don't know. What I do know -- or at least believe -- is that nothing good will come if you and I say nothing.

In other words, you should care about questions and situations like this! Why? Because pretty much every law, every political claim, moral claim, religious claim, and even many of our interpersonal and social turmoils can be distilled down to two practical dynamics; good or bad will, and consistent or flawed thinking.

There is no point in trying to deal or negotiate with someone who is operating under a bad will, but many people don't intend bad; they are just confused. Even if we have a good will, we can be easily tricked into doing or supporting bad things by clever arguments and appeals. By learning to think more clearly, more rationally, we can detect fundamental errors like this one, improve our own lives and, in doing so, improve our families and society.

Consider this very question: Are there moral absolutes? Why does this matter? It matters because a person or society that believes there are no moral absolutes is not simply being irrational, but can justify literally any behavior, no matter how grotesque, by any number of means. That will not be the case for the person or society who believes that there are absolute moral rules, almost akin to mathematical or physical laws, which we simply must not break under any conditions.

Is it Immoral to Help the Rich?

[An example of how philosophical counseling can assist someone who is making a career decision.]

On a philosophical discussion forum a member posted a question asking for career advice. He is a financial adviser and an advancement opportunity appeared whereby he would be advising relatively-affluent people on how to minimize their investment and debt costs as well as tax burdens. Basically, he'd be getting paid to help rich people save money. However, he expressed a sense of guilt about the opportunity, a hesitation, and asked whether people thought he would be "doing a good thing for society" by taking the job.

I began by commending him for listening to his conscience and asking questions about the moral quality of his choices and actions. The desire to have one's actions be beneficial to society is a good one. However, precisely what does or does not benefit society as a whole is not something we can often see very clearly. Obviously, some actions benefit certain individuals, and might harm others, and we wouldn't want to accept a job in which we engaged in, supported or benefited from evil acts, but whether any action is a net positive for society, now or in the future, is really anyone's guess. (It is also an appeal to a particular moral philosophy called Utilitarianism, which attempts to evaluate the moral value of an action by the degree to which it benefits and is approved of by society, but we can discuss that another time.)

So I asked him to rephrase his question to ask whether his choice would or could be positively harmful to anyone? Specifically, who would be harmed in any measurable way by helping people save money? Could he actually identify the person who was harmed, and quantify the harm done? Many people talk about how something is going to be good or bad for society, but in nebulous terms. Certainly, if his advice involved stealing from or defrauding people, or benefiting from some kind of immoral situation (e.g., slave labor), then there is a problem. But helping rich people save money isn't quite the same as helping a murderer sharpen his knives. Affluent people tend to spend their money; their purchases pay for people's jobs, and therefore their food, housing, clothing, education, healthcare, as well as that of their children, etc. A person who makes $200,000 in a year often spends some or all of it. Same for the person who makes $20,000. But the former person's spending did ten times as much to "benefit society" in an economic sense. Consequently, helping people save more of their money so they can spend it on things they enjoy seems to me to be a morally-good act, at least in that respect.

With respect to avoiding taxes, the (controversial) reality is that, in most cases, taxation is little more than theft via fraud and extortion. We are generally born into a system where it is the norm (not entirely unlike someone born into an abusive family), and so attempt to rationalize it in various ways. But to believe that there is anything honorable or moral about paying taxes is probably delusional. Some might argue that taxes go to help people in need, but the primary, direct beneficiaries of taxation are government workers -- only a very small fraction of any money collected via taxation actually finds its way into the hands of "people in need." Indeed, government entities generally refuse to even report such figures.

There are much more effective ways of helping people in need -- of helping society -- than paying taxes, if that was really one's motivation. In addition, like almost anyone who experiences a seemingly-unstoppable and widespread wrong, rather than fight or resist it we frequently decry those who seem to escape it. That is, we don't throw off our own yokes, but we attack those who do. Hence, we are typically more angry about the person who doesn't pay his taxes -- the one who didn't "pay his fair share" -- than we are about the system of taxation and all of the evil it is and facilitates in the first place.

In any event, I suggested to him that I at least could see nothing immoral in helping people minimize their experience of theft by fraud and extortion (no matter what euphemism we give it), as long as doing so did not expose them to some greater evil.

Image not to scale. :)

But there is something more subtle at play in this young man's thinking (which he has yet to work out). He is troubled and is asking these questions either because there is some conflict within his own beliefs and values, or because they are in conflict with the circumstance (or his understanding thereof) that he is considering. First, his concerns imply a belief that affluence -- especially keeping control of one's money or possessions -- is intrinsically immoral. He is not far from the truth here, in the sense that an attachment to material goods is at least personally harmful, and can also end up being harmful to others. The person who has succumbed to materialism finds disordered pleasure in the acquisition and control of goods. This is problematic in itself, and often leads to other vices (vices tend to come in bunches). Such a person desires to possess, but becomes possessed by and because of his own desires. The man seemed to feel that by assisting affluent people, he would be perpetuating materialism. But as a matter of pure reasoning, though it might be true to say that all materialists attempt to avoid unnecessary expenses, it is wrong to say that all who attempt to avoid unnecessary expenses are materialists. Consequently, the act of helping people avoid unnecessary expenses does not necessarily promote harmful materialism.

His concerns further implied a kind of unspoken belief that affluent people should be paying more for things -- they should be paying more for mortgages, and paying more in taxes -- and that he might be doing something immoral by helping them avoid such costs. This is somewhat obscured by his question about whether it would be "good for society" for him to help affluent people. This is not far removed from the communist/socialist maxim popularized by Karl Marx, "From each according to his ability. To each according to his needs." This implies a whole gaggle of beliefs regarding the relationship of the person to others in society, the role of property, etc., all of which would take considerable time to untangle. Suffice it to say that there are some things that would not be good for society, but helping people -- even affluent people -- save money does not strike me as being among these.

In the end, I advised him to reflect more deeply upon his own beliefs and values, and why he felt guilty about the possibility of personally benefiting (in the sense of being employed) by helping people save their own money. It is likely that he will discover, if he digs far enough, that the tension is between his own desire for affluence, and a feeling that there is something dirty in its pursuit -- a conflict rooted in some guilt about his own opportunities and desires. Perhaps he feels unworthy, or is afraid he will fail and so is looking for a way out. It is also possible (though less likely) that he is subconsciously sensing something about the position, company or overall circumstance that may be difficult, harmful or dangerous to him or his relationships, but isn't present to his conscious mind.

I suggested to him that he work this through -- clarify his beliefs and values -- before accepting the position, lest he end up in a place where he is personally compromised or acting in conflict with his own convictions.

Gregorian Chant, Stinkin' Thinkin', and Self Defense

Last weekent I attended a Gregorian Chant workshop led by Dr. Lynne Bissonnette-Pitre of Cantus Angelorum, and hosted by the Brigittine Monks in Amity, Oregon. It was quite good.

Gregorian Chant is the official, traditional music of the Catholic Church and of the Catholic Liturgy (ironically, you'd be hard pressed to find any Catholic parish in which it is actually practiced, but that is a sad story for another time). Dr. Bissonnette-Pitre and the other members of her group provided a series of presentations, exercises and experiences to help the attendees better understand, appreciate and participate in chanted prayer. The specific context was the Catholic Mass, in and for which this method of sung prayer was developed (though it can be employed in other prayers, too).

Here is a short example from the youtubes:

Gregorian Chant refers both to a method of sung prayer (generally in Latin), as well as any of the 4000-or-so specific prayers that demonstrate the same. The practice appears to have started in the early Christian Church (and was derived from a similar practice in Judaism), where it grew for several centuries through oral tradition. "Oral tradition" means that it was passed on from person to person verbally, without being written down. Eventually, a method of transcribing the words and melodies developed, leading to things like:

But my purpose here is not to talk about or explain Gregorian Chant as much as it is to pass on an interesting principle expressed by Dr. Bissonnette-Pitre during her last presentation. Historically, chanted prayer was frequently recommended to those who were struggling with temptation, frustrations, sins, etc. The belief is that a person becomes more peaceful, virtuous and avoids vice to the degree that he is able to engage in positive practices like Gregorian Chant. Part of this had to do with the words of the chant, which are generally from the Bible and promote being virtuous, trusting God, etc. But it also had to do with the nature of the chanting, itself.

According to Dr. Bissonnette-Pitre (who is also a psychologist), various studies indicate that exposure to -- and especially participation in -- chant tends to reduce stress levels, slow and deepen breathing, slow the heart rate, reduce blood pressure, even lower the body temperature. It appears to have an overall-calming effect on most people, whereas some other kinds of music appear to have an agitating effect.

This seems to correspond to and complement other studies. Indeed, it appears that simply practicing periods of deep breathing has helped people with high blood pressure, anxiety difficulties, etc. Chant naturally incorporates this, and complements it with other meditative qualities. Together, it is foreseeable that these could have a generally-positive effect for many people, especially when dealing with a stressful event.

For example, suppose someone cuts me off in traffic, nearly causing an accident. At the time, I am very likely to have some kind of emotional response to the event (hopefully a proportional one), and it is possible that I'll still be a little rattled later, depending on the severity. Having no emotional response whatsoever, as well as having one that is excessive both indicate imbalances. Further, there are a couple obvious mistakes I could make in coping with this, or with any similar event. One might be to actively suppress it, pretend like it never happened, when it did, in fact, bother me. In such cases unresolved tensions might express themselves in other ways, such as how I treat others, or the development of vices, as we have discussed elsewhere. 

Another error would be to habitually replay it in my mind, "practicing" it and the surrounding emotions. That is only going to upset me further, and is singularly unhealthy. We often recognize the problem with this, that we are doing something harmful, but in responding just make another error. We say, "stop thinking about X, stop thinking about X, stop thinking about X, I've got to stop thinking about X.... Why can't I stop thinking about X? Will someone please help me to stop thinking about X!" Of course, all we are doing is continuing to think about X, but now with an added layer of guilt, frustration and sense of helplessness that we can't get ourselves to stop thinking about X.

The issue isn't simply that we need to stop thinking about X, but that we need to replace it with something good, positive, healthy. This is what Gregorian Chant does for many people. It provides a calming, positive, meditative outlet that simultaneously makes it difficult-to-impossible to continue focusing on the negative... at least for the duration of the chant. We are simultaneously turning away from the agitation and toward something that is positive in and of itself.

This all might seem rather abstract, so consider a physical analogy. I teach self defense and, especially with beginners, we teach them that, when confronted by an attacker, their best action is almost always to run, and if they can't immediately run, fight to escape. The primary reason is one of survival -- it is generally easier to escape from someone rather than engage and defeat him. It is only if we can't escape, or if we must remain for some other reason (such as to protect someone else), that we engage a dangerous opponent, and even then we do so at much greater risk to ourselves. This is similar to the interior life. There are times to face and engage our demons, and sometimes we have no choice, but frequently the best way to survive the encounter is to  render them irrelevant -- not by ignoring them or pretending they don't exist, and not by attempting to engage them directly, but by turning away from and replacing them with something positive.

This principle of both rejecting the bad and turning toward the good is present in many religions, in virtue-ethics moral philosophy, as well as Logic Based Therapy, which always suggests a positive, counter-acting virtuous habit to try to help the person move away from error and vice.

What are some positive things that you do to help cope with stress and frustrations?

Vaccination, Deniers and Religion

Some people say that vaccination is responsible for the near eradication of dangerous diseases, and that those who do not vaccinate themselves or their children are a threat to society (and should be forcibly vaccinated). Others argue that vaccination is not a sure thing, is not exclusively responsible for the eradication of disease (if at all), poses long term problems for the species, and may have acute, immediate risks. Some people also object to some or all vaccinations on a variety of moral or religious grounds.

And some people just hate needles.

One of the immediate difficulties encountered in discussions of this and similar matters is the average person's inability to remain focused, be precise, and reason deeply (or speak charitably and respectfully with others). Most claims simultaneously (and erroneously) cover multiple issues, and involve little more than an assertion coupled with an ad hominem smear against anyone who holds a different position. For example, the following post was brought to my attention. It was written by a popular Catholic author, Mark Shea:

"We are now in the situation of Catholics who consider themselves the gold standard for orthodoxy trusting neither the Magisterium nor reason and listening only to tribal echo chambers and themselves as they cobble together personal philosophy from crap on the web. It will not end well and is about as far from the Catholic intellectual tradition as you can get. It's a form of Protestantism that has not yet been given a formal name."

I had no idea what he was ranting about, but was intrigued because a lot of people were affirming him -- about 150 at last count, including one of my former theology professors. Not wanting to be left out of the party, I asked for clarification:

"Mark, I'm not sure to whom you are referring when you speak of Catholics who portray themselves as the 'gold standard' of orthodoxy yet trust neither the Magisterium nor reason. Even if such people do exist, why does it matter to you? There are always crazies among us, and there is no sense trying to reason with or expect much from them. I'm also not clear on what you mean by 'Catholic intellectual tradition' (as if there is only a single, monolithic-like one). Perhaps you could clarify these comments."

Mark later replied:

"Seth: It matters in this case because Catholics who think they are smarter than the Church and every medical authority on earth are helping to encourage behaviors that place my grand-daughters' lives at risk with their foolish vaccine denialism."

Ah, so this is about vaccination. Okay. That narrows it a bit, but it is still quite ambiguous. About whom is he writing? About which vaccine(s)? About which vaccination issue? And what does the Catholic Church have to do with this? I could only guess.

But notice how the topic is framed. Mark opens by attacking the character of those who differ with his position (whatever that is). They are frauds. They think they are smart, but they are stupid. "Every medical authority on earth" agrees with Mark, and these "deniers" are dangerous to society. Doing a little more research, I discovered that this is unfortunately how Mark typically interacts with those who don't share his opinions. As disappointing as that is, we must remember that such behavior is by no means unique to Mark or to Catholics. One need only watch a political talk show for about five minutes (or scan almost any Internet discussion) to find similar attitudes expressed. This is something about which we all must be cautious. 

Further, as we frequently do, Mark is engaging in the very behavior which he decries in others. He is presenting his own position (whatever that actually is) as the moral one, the orthodox one, the reasonable one, and pretends that everyone else somehow has dirty (germy) hands. Yet nowhere in this series of assertions does one find the presentation of any evidence, of any facts. Further, there is a great deal of ambiguity. The ranting is not about any person in particular, any vaccine in particular, or any manifestation thereof. In this way, he is simultaneously writing about everything and nothing. His position is, for all practical purposes, untouchable... almost.

Trying to discern the rationale -- the reasoning -- behind a
belief is a little like trying to separate and trace cords in
a tangled mess. Once separated, each cord can then
be examined and tested to see if it "works."

We frequently don't know what reasoning led to or is implied by our beliefs, words, emotional responses and choices. Indeed, more often than not, little or no reasoning was involved; we were just reacting or "running on autopilot," acting habitually. It is among the fundamental practices of philosophy (and especially philosophical counseling) to discern or tease out what reasoning actually led to a particular state, or, if no reasoning was actually employed, the reasoning that was implied -- the reasoning that would have been employed to arrive at the same destination. We can then examine that reasoning for strengths, weaknesses, fallacies, etc. Still uncertain about what had Mark so exercised, I pointed out that Mark's assertions thus far imply a certain set of beliefs:

1. That the Catholic Church -- the "Magisterium," specifically -- has made some kind of definitive proclamation on vaccination.
2. That the Church is an authority and expert in matters of vaccination.
3. That the Church's proclamation in this issue is binding upon the faithful.
4. That all issues of vaccination (as believed by Mark) are uniformly held by medical professionals, are self-evident truths, etc.
5. That anyone who doubts or questions this or might point to counter-evidence is a "foolish denier" and Catholic fraud.

There are a couple issues here that are unique to Catholicism, which I will briefly explain for the non-Catholic reader. First, the "Magisterium" refers to the teaching office or authority of the Church. This is not a particular person or physical office (though it does refer to some, exceedingly rare pronouncements by the Pope), but refers to the action of teaching the Catholic faith as entrusted, collectively, to the bishops, of which there are presently about 5100 worldwide. Specifically, the Church asserts that it has expertise and authority in matters of morals and faith. That is, if the Church says that it is wrong to murder someone, then Catholics are obligated to believe (and act) that it is wrong to murder. If the Church teaches that God exists eternally, then Catholics are obligated to believe, as a matter of faith, that God exists eternally. However, the Church is not an expert and has no binding authority in other matters. If the Church (or some individual bishop) says that the sun revolves around the earth, that plumbing should be performed only with iron pipes, that the ideal tax rate is 39%, or that the proper way to treat rabies is with leeches and soy sauce, then Catholics are (obviously) free to smile sweetly, say "thank you for expressing your valued opinion," and then go on and believe and do what we know to be correct.

Some Catholics collapse this boundary and attempt to set the stage as if theirs is the only moral, Catholic one by asserting that all human actions are moral actions... when it suits their purposes. In this they are (usually unwittingly) paraphrasing Thomas Aquinas, and rightly observing that all human acts have, in a sense, a moral dimension, or at least moral implications. In making this leap, though, such persons are attempting to impose what they believe to be a Church teaching on others by distorting the Church's teachings beyond recognition. It doesn't really work.

In any event, this is roughly the reasoning and attitude under-girding Mark's statements. The problem is that none of these things are actually true: The Magisterium has not made a definitive statement regarding vaccinations, and even if it did, it has no expertise or authority in that science. Further, his claim that "every medical authority on earth" agrees with him is demonstrably false (though he would simply dismiss anyone who does not agree as a non-authoritative quack). And since his assertions have no grounding, they can be rightly dismissed with little more effort than, "well, that is merely your opinion."

But I didn't do that. Rather, I requested that he please be more specific, and provide some evidence to justify his claims so that I could better understand the issue. There is always a chance that I'm wrong, that I've missed some important piece of the puzzle that someone else can see. I also expressed concern that he seemed to be manifesting the very behavior and attitudes that he criticized in others. At that point he dismissed me by writing that I don't know what I'm talking about.

I hear that a lot. Perhaps he was correct.

Truth Should Be Proposed, Never Imposed

One of the many ways that people have attempted
to impose their beliefs on others.

This is important to recognize in any contentious matter. If you ask for evidence or the rationale behind a position, and the person dismisses or attacks you, you can know that you've probably just touched upon a matter that the person may believe sincerely and passionately, but probably not for rational reasons. We don't have a great deal of solid justification for many of the things we believe, and for the most part that is okay. It doesn't mean that we are wrong. But when someone questions or challenges us on one of these beliefs, and our response is instinctively aggressive or defensive, that suggests something is amiss.

Further, it is one thing to say "I believe X." It is quite another to say, "You should believe X, and if you don't, you are a moron." Once we go from "I believe" to "you must believe or you are stupid," then it is imperative that we have some very, very solid evidence to back up what we are saying, and be willing to provide it.

Philosophy, knowledge, debate and the like are ideally not about assertions, opinions and personal smears. They are about the ability to inquire into and demonstrate the truth of a matter in a way that others can understand. In the best of cases, a debate is not an attempt to win, but a mutual effort to find the truth. This is incredibly freeing! When you can make an issue into an honest, shared search for truth rather than an attempt to defend or impose your own personal beliefs, wonderful things can happen! To that end, if it is at all possible, when in a disagreement, do whatever you can to approach the matter with the attitude of wanting to detect the truth, even if it turns out that it is inconvenient or differs from what you currently believe.

As I have mentioned before, most immanent differences ultimately reduce down to more fundamental differences, usually having to do with epistemology (how we can say that we know something) along with other basic premises. With a little more research it became clear(er) that Mark's agitation had to do with people who object to certain vaccinations on moral grounds. The issue is that the genesis of some current vaccines can be traced back to aborted fetuses, and some people feel that it is immoral to use such vaccines -- that to do so is, in a way, a kind of participation in and support of the abortive action. This is actually a reasonable position, whether from the perspective of (secular) philosophical ethics, Catholic tradition or even the Bible (Romans 14, et. al.). However, Mark believes otherwise, and he and his supporters assert that people who disagree are dangerous "jackasses," to quote one of his devotes.

To justify their position, they could (and do) reference a 2005 letter and study generated via the Pontifical Academy for Life that (1) strongly affirms the immorality of products resulting from actions like abortion and an obligation to avoid participation therein, but (2) argues that some people could use the vaccines if there were no alternatives and the immanent use was necessary to save lives. (There is a second document from 2008, Dignitatis Personae, that provides additional general guidance.) The letter and related report identify several vaccines developed from aborted fetuses, including vaccines for measles, mumps, rubella, chicken pox, polio, smallpox, rabies and hepatitis A. According to some sources, there are not presently alternative vaccines in the USA for rubella, chicken pox or hepatitis A. None of these are generally serious or fatal, except to the unborn or otherwise infirm. Rubella tends to come in waves, but hasn't been seen in the USA in awhile. However, its last wave appears to have been a factor in nearly 30,000 stillborn deaths, and another 20,000 deformities (it is estimated that 50-90% of unborn children are seriously affected if the pregnant mother contracts rubella). Chicken pox kills a few thousand people worldwide annually (representing a mortality rate of under 0.01%). Hepatitis A is prevalent in less sanitary countries, and kills an estimated 100,000 people annually, out of ~1.4 million infections worldwide via liver failure and related complications (representing a substantial mortality rate of about 7%).

The position taken by the Pontifical Academy for Life is a highly nuanced position. 

1. It is not, as Mark asserted, something from the Magisterium in the sense of an articulation from the body of bishops or that would otherwise be binding upon Catholics.
2. It is not the only or exclusive reasonable position... though it is quite reasonable. 
3. With respect to "Catholic Intellectual Tradition," the reality is that there isn't a single, historical approach to any or all questions. However, the Thomistic/Aristotelian virtue-ethics model is predominant over the last millennium, and the way that the report is articulated manifests such an approach. At first I suspected that the underlying reasoning was an actual or implied appeal to the moral dynamic of secondary or unintended (but foreseeable) consequences -- this is often appealed to in the Catholic tradition, though it has its own serious problems -- but closer examinations reveals that it is simply an appeal to practical expediency; that is, in the absence of other means of protecting life, this will have to do until something better comes along. To make this comprehensible, consider this analogy: Suppose a ship was made by slave traders many years ago for the very purpose of transporting captive slaves. They actually built it with their bones and skulls molded right into parts of the ship (to push the point). The slavery was eventually ended, and even the original makers and owners of the ship have since died. No one wanted anything to do with the ship, and there was talk of burning it. However, before that could be done, the volcanic island on which you live began to crumble into the ocean, and the only remaining ship that can save you and your family is that slave ship. Assuming there is no other realistic chance of survival, do you use it and save your life even though it has a tainted origin and disgusts you? Or do you stand on principle and risk almost-certain death for yourself or family? The stand of the report's authors is, basically, that it is reasonable to use the ship to save your life if you have no alternative.
4. The letter does not obligate the reader to go and receive vaccines derived from aborted fetuses -- it merely asserts that, in some cases, a person who does so is not guilty of formally (intentionally and knowingly) engaging in evil. The difficult part is the statement (clarified in a footnote of the letter) that parents who voluntarily refuse to vaccinate themselves or their children are morally culpable for any harm that results from that decision. For example, a child might contract rubella and, before showing symptoms, transmit it to a pregnant mother. This places some people in a difficult place: Receive a vaccine derived from aborted fetuses, or (possibly) risk viral infection for one's self, one's children, or others. The error in thinking here is the assumption that a vaccinated person could not also transmit the disease. 

This is a problem for which there is not an easy, clean answer. The primary error is to pretend that there is one, and that mine is it, and that everyone else is an idiot in need of forced re-education. This is a frequent error made by those who dabble in philosophy or theology -- the presumption that either field provides clear concise answers to difficult questions, or that whatever answer I've arrived at is the only reasonable one.

And that is how it goes, especially when we begin tampering with stuff. This isn't to say that we shouldn't tamper -- tampering can be fun and lead to amazing things -- but merely to acknowledge that our ability to tamper can lead to tough situations, and frequently outstrips our ability to comprehend and work out the moral implications of our actions.

Try to Be Likable

Don't be this guy. No one cares
what he has to say.

Before moving on, there is a relevant dynamic worth noting. Even if you are right, few people will listen to you if they don't like you. For example, if you and I are having a discussion about a topic on which we differ, and in the process of the discussion I insult you, am rude, or otherwise come off offensively, chances are that my position is going to be rejected on that basis alone... even if I was right... even if it could save your life.

In all honesty, this is something with which I've struggled for, well, forever. No one likes to hear that he is wrong, and if that is accompanied by implications that he is stupid, evil or some other simultaneous innuendo, it increases the chances of the message being rejected along with the messenger.

We turn now to briefly address some of the questions raised in the first paragraph.

1. Is vaccination responsible for the eradication of diseases?

Many studies of disease-related mortality rates show ongoing and dramatic declines long before a related vaccine was developed and implemented. But the mortality rate doesn't measure how many people are infected by or carry a disease -- it measures how many people die from it. Because the decline in mortality rate came before the vaccine even existed, it clearly had nothing to due with the vaccine. The decline could be the result of many influences; general population health, increased cleanliness and sanitation, better water supply, improved medical services, etc.

The morbidity or infection rate attempts to measure the number of people showing symptoms associated with actual infection. If a group of people are exposed to a disease, and half of them become infected and show symptoms, the disease would be said to have a 50% morbidity or infection rate. Though vaccination does not appear to have much of an influence on the death (mortality) rate of those who are infected, for some diseases it does appear to reduce the rate of infection. So, if the mortality rate from a disease drops from 10% to 0.1%, this means that, of those infected, the death rate dropped from 100 per 1000 to 1 per 1000. That is a great thing, but probably had little to do with vaccination. However, if the infection rate drops from 50% to 10% shortly after the introduction of vaccination (and nothing else significant changed), then it is reasonable to presume that change was due to vaccination. Though this is not a direct change to mortality rates, the change in infection rate is naturally going to iterate through to cause a change in the gross mortality to the population.

Imagine a moderately-sized city of 100,000 people. Suppose that, over a year, roughly all 100,000 of them are exposed to a particular disease. If 50% of them become infected by a disease, and there is a 0.1% mortality rate, then it can be expected that roughly 50 people are going to die from the disease or related complications (100,000 x 50% x 0.1%). After vaccination, the infection rate decreases from 50% to 10%, and the actual deaths due to the disease could be reduced to as few as 10 persons (100,000 x 10% x 0.1%). Though the vaccination doesn't affect the death rate due to infection, it does decrease the total number of deaths by reducing the number of infected persons.

It also appears that, once the prevalence of infection becomes low enough, usually due to sanitation and other efforts, widespread vaccination can be effective at finishing the job and helping keep certain strains of particular diseases from re-establishing a foothold in the population. However, several factors make it nearly impossible to completely eliminate a disease:

• Even if no one is presently infected, the germs are still present in the environment, and are transmitted by both the vaccinated and non-vaccinated.
• Vaccinated people can often still become infected at varying rates. (For example, in a recent mumps outbreak, research indicated that as many as 84% of the 6700 infected people had been vaccinated, indicating almost zero effectiveness against the disease.)
• Other strains of the disease may appear to which vaccination provides little or no resistance.
• And, obviously, non-vaccinated people can become infected.

This suggests that vaccination alone is not enough to eliminate a disease that has become established in a population, but that several factors, including vaccination, can work together to dramatically decrease its presence.

2. Are those who do not vaccinate a danger to others?

Anyone who carries a dangerous virus or bacteria is a hazard to others, irrespective of whether he is vaccinated, showing symptoms, otherwise immune, etc.

Proponents of blanket, compulsory vaccination argue that non-vaccinated people are a danger to society. This argument appears to correspond to our experience, which is that being around sick people -- especially if there is any close contact -- often results in transmission of the virus or bacteria to the formerly-healthy person. It is then up to the healthy person's immune system to deal with the invader.

The problem, of course, is that if vaccination was actually as robust as people seem to believe, then non-vaccinated people would only be a danger to themselves, which leads to the second form of this argument: Some assert that voluntary-non-vaccinators are a danger to those who cannot be vaccinated due to age, being in the womb, allergy or other condition.

Let us grant that, in general and for the average person, vaccination appears to reduce the chances of developing symptoms related to specific viruses and bacteria with varying degrees of effectiveness and duration. However, vaccination is not a guarantee of immunity, nor does it prevent transmission. Many vaccines fail to provide much protection for a variety of reasons. Second, even if someone is immune, whether due to vaccine or nature, he can still carry and transmit a disease to others by a variety of mechanisms, often with few or no symptoms (granted, symptomatic people generally seem to be more contagious than asymptomatic). Indeed, in the recent measles outbreak in California and elsewhere, some research indicated that the source was actually vaccinated, and that the infection spread through many vaccinated persons (as well as non-vaccinated).

So the real issue here is that, in general, both vaccinated and non-vaccinated persons can carry and transmit diseases, though symptomatic persons are probably more heavily infected and are more likely to spread disease to others (including caretakers) via contact or proximity. However, the twist here is that it is the very issue of being symptomatic that makes one more likely to take precautions and segregate himself from others, thereby protecting others from infection (granted, it may be spread anyway, especially if it is transmissible prior to becoming symptomatic, or if the symptoms aren't recognized immediately). And, somewhat anti-intuitively, it is the asymptomatic -- even vaccinated or otherwise immune -- person, who might be a carrier and transmitting the disease to others, including those who cannot be vaccinated for a variety of reasons.

Overall, vaccination appears to be a contributor to the reduction and near-elimination of some diseases, along with a variety of efforts. It also reduces the chances of the vaccinated person contracting a particular disease and becoming symptomatic. However, even a vaccinated person can carry and spread germs. Consequently, the arguments that vaccination alone is responsible for the eradication of disease, or that vaccination prevents the spread of disease do not appear to be true. Nonetheless, this does seem to indicate that vaccination is, on the whole, a beneficial practice.

Let us look now at the arguments against vaccination, which are generally of two kinds:

1. The benefits of vaccination do not outweigh the risks.
2. Some kinds of vaccination are immoral due to their genesis.

We'll also briefly introduce another, controversial argument on the matter.

3. Do the dangers of vaccination outweigh the benefits?

The actual dangers (and severity) posed by vaccines are also, unfortunately, unclear. The CDC and similar organizations argue that vaccines are among the safest products available and refer to a variety of reports to confirm this, but one could argue that this is a little like the frequent police statements that they investigated their actions and found them to be completely justified. Somehow, that almost always seems to be the case when organizations investigate themselves -- they generally turn up as pure as the "wind driven snow." And we don't need to go very far before stumbling upon a list of government-approved foods, chemicals and drugs that were later learned to be terrible for you.

For the sake of discussion, let us just grant that, with respect to society as a whole in the near-term, the dangers of vaccinations seem to be lesser than the dangers of non-vaccination. For some individuals in certain circumstances, however, it is true that vaccination is more dangerous. That is, it is true that some people have adverse, debilitating, even deadly reactions to vaccination. The causes of such reactions are many, and often unclear. Perhaps there was something wrong with the batch of vaccine. Perhaps the person had a reaction to the active agent or transport chemicals. Perhaps one or both of these interacted with something else (e.g., another vaccine, medicine or drug) in the person's system. Many doctors raise concerns about the necessity, effectiveness and safety of vaccination, especially for babies, children and those who are unwell or taking other medications. These concerns seem reasonable.

With regard to the benefits, the efficacy and necessity of some vaccines is rightly questioned. There is little point in being inoculated against a disease to which you are not likely to be exposed, or which you can easily survive, especially if that inoculation carries with it the possibility of various unwanted side-effects. A similar argument could be raised against vaccines that, for the most part, constitute protection from the consequences of voluntary, avoidable behaviors. For example, there was recently a push to have all young females injected with Gardasil, which is believed to prevent the establishment of a virus responsible for genital warts and many cancers. That seems, at first glance, to be an obviously-right choice to make. No one wants his daughter to die of cancer -- cervical or any other kind. However, it turns out, upon a closer read, that the treatment is specifically (and only) for sexually transmitted diseases. Again, no one wants his children to become infected by any disease, sexually transmitted or not, but when we begin to inoculate children against sexually transmitted diseases, we are entering a new ethical realm, and one for which we don't really have any pre-existing framework from which to reason. The difference between this and handing them condoms is murky at best, and complicated by the fact that adverse reactions to Gardasil have been reported. In this we begin moving in the direction of lifestyle- and choice-related vaccination, as opposed to vaccination against diseases that one is likely to contract innocently. This is not to say or imply that such vaccinations are wrong, but merely that the topic is far from clear, clean and easily resolved.

Apart from voluntary, behavior-related vaccinations, the argument here is really rooted in statistical risk-avoidance. According to the Centers for Disease Control, adverse reactions to vaccination range from one per thousand injections to one per millions. As such it is arguable and demonstrable that the risks of not being vaccinated in the presence of a deadly illness outweigh the risks associated with vaccination. Consider, for example, chicken pox vaccination. Chicken pox is highly contagious, but the chances of dying due to chicken pox appear to run about 0.001% for children, or one in 100,000 infections. If the chances of a deadly or serious reaction to vaccination approached this, that would be a good argument for avoiding vaccination. On the other hand, consider rabies. The death rate for rabies is ~100% if one is not vaccinated prior to the appearance of symptoms. In such a case, the chances of serious adverse reaction to vaccination would have to also approach 100% in order to justify rational rejection of vaccination on the basis of possible bad reaction. This is clearly not the case for most vaccinations.

We intuitively make these kinds of comparisons and calculations frequently and imprecisely... especially once emotions come into play.

There is a subjective difference, however, in that if someone catches a disease and dies from that disease, we generally do not perceive in that something immoral, something wrong. It is certainly a tragedy, but not one that we can (generally) attribute to an individual choice or act. On the other hand, if someone gets a shot and then has an adverse reaction, perhaps leading to permanent disability or death, then we feel a kind of responsibility, as it was the result of a positive action. These feelings of responsibility and remorse are understandable, even if not completely rational (in the sense of being statistically justifiable), and probably play a part in one's mental calculations.

4. Are some vaccinations immoral?

This was covered to some extent in the introductory paragraphs. To the degree that the way in which a vaccine is developed (or used) violates someone's moral compass, it seems that he should have the freedom to reject the vaccine, simultaneously accepting the responsibility for his choice. However, this needs to be weighed against any obligation he has to protect other people's lives, especially those of his children. For example, let us imagine that your child is bitten by a dog that turns out to have rabies, and the only treatment -- the only way to save your child's life -- is to receive a vaccine that is derived from the pituitary glands harvested from 3 year old children from a small tribe in Africa. The question is, is the parent who rejects such a treatment for his child doing something evil or immoral?

The answer in that and similar cases seems fairly clear, but things become cloudy as we move from hyperbolic, extreme examples to reality, and to circumstances that merely involve animal testing or similar.

5. Is vaccination harmful to the species in the long-term?

It is a little ironic, but the position that appeals to the long term, natural robustness and health of the species as a whole -- that appeals to the good of society in general -- it seems would need to be against artificial vaccination. While vaccination tends to reduce the chance of infection for a particular unit, and therefore might extend individual lives, it does little or nothing to aid the long-term natural immunity of "the herd." The evolutionary process has a natural tendency of making it so that the stronger, the healthier, the more fit survive and pass on their genes to others. Vaccination circumvents this, allowing those who are not immune and less healthy to pass on their genes just as well as those who are healthy.

I'm not suggesting or implying that we should therefore go without vaccines or just let people die when they get sick. Far from it! I merely bring it up because those who argue for vaccination frequently reference the health of society, the herd, the species, etc. They argue from the good of the whole to impose an obligation upon the individual. However, their argument is very shortsighted, and actually, from a scientific point of view, undermines the very value they claim to be championing. (As a counter-argument to this, it could be asserted that various viruses and such change so rapidly that such long-term natural immunity is actually impossible. But it would be interesting to see some studies of both perspectives here.)

6. Is correlation the same as causation?

Hardcore-proponents of vaccination generally disregard mortality data and instead point to morbidity as evidence of the effectiveness of vaccines. For example, consider the apparent-decrease in infection rates around the introduction of vaccines in this chart from an article at Vaccine Impact:

The darker line indicates a substantial drop in infection rates after the introduction of the vaccine. Though susceptible to the correct criticism that correlation is not causation -- it is possible that something else or some combination of factors caused the decline -- repeated examples of the same dynamic at different times, with different populations, different geographies and different vaccines/diseases would make for a very persuasive case.

However, if we are going conflate correlation with causation when it comes to a reduction in incidence of one dynamic, we don't get a free pass to ignore simultaneous, similar changes in other dynamics. For example, according to a variety of sources (including the CDC), the incidence of autism has increased since about 1970 to now from about 1 in 2000-5000 children to about 1 in 70-100. And if the entire spectrum of various neurological disorders are included, that figure jumps to as many as 1 in 6.

The causes for this are unclear. There may be a connection to vaccination... or there might not. It could be aliens... or proximity to computer hardware... or unleaded gasoline. What is clear is that the same reasoning that people say proves that vaccination eliminated disease -- the correlation between introduction, vaccination rate and incidence -- also indicates that vaccination caused the increase in autism rates (as well as other disorders having a similar incidence pattern).

The curve is a little too pretty and neat. It is obviously not to scale.

Now, I'm not saying that vaccination is responsible for this. I simply don't know. Causation is a much more difficult issue in real life than people tend to presume. Specifically, we tend to assume that, just because event Y came after X, that X caused Y, when that might not be the case. There is even a logical fallacy named just for this common thinking error, post hoc ergo propter hoc ("after this therefore because of this").

If someone is going to use incidence and vaccination rates as "proof" of effectiveness, it is inconsistent -- and disingenuous -- to then just ignore those statistics when they don't play in his favor.

7. Are arguments by analogy valid?

Something that has been prevalent in the whole vaccination debate is an attempt to condescendingly "prove" one's position by arguing via analogy. This has ranged from comparing not vaccinating to letting zombies into your home, to taking the brakes off of your car, etc. This isn't unique to this topic, but because vaccination is complex and the issues are hard to comprehend directly, people often appeal to analogies to make their points.

Let me say this very clearly:

ANALOGIES PROVE ABSOLUTELY NOTHING

Because most people have almost no training whatsoever in logic, they get away with this nonsense, but it really is just that: nonsense. For example, it does not follow from the fact that it might be foolish to take the brakes off of your car that you are a dangerous fool if you don't receive every vaccine in existence. One could just as easily argue that not putting breaks on your car is like not eating peanut butter. There is no logical, rational connection whatsoever between a car's brake system, and injecting chemicals and germs into your body in an attempt to avoid disease. It is a horrible analogy, about as relevant as the infamous Chewbacca Defense. Even if it was a good, tighter one, it still wouldn't prove anything.

Analogies can be useful when it comes to helping people understand something new. Via analogy, the new thing can be related to something the person already knows, creating a kind of bridge. For example, basic electronics is often explained to beginners via water plumbing analogy wherein water pressure is like voltage, water flow is like amperage, a line blockage is resistance, etc. But beyond instructive purposes, analogies need to be used with great caution. If one is being employed in an argument, then there is very likely something wrong with the argument, itself.

Concluding Remarks

Some vaccinations, along with general sanitation, food quality and medical services, do appear to contribute positively to overall public health, longevity and quality of life. Vaccination also appears to reduce the overall chance of contracting certain strains of diseases. However, vaccinated or not, it is still possible to spread germs to others, or even contract the disease, though clearly those who have a serious infection and are symptomatic are likely to be a greater source of germs than others. To the degree that the chance of adverse reaction approach the chance of serious complication due to infection -- and this may vary from person to person and depend on many factors -- it is rational to avoid vaccination. It also isn't clear that the array of vaccinations given to newborns is necessary, or that the benefits outweigh the risks. There are also understandable moral arguments against certain vaccinations, insofar as the genesis of those vaccines seems immoral or the exclusive purpose of the vaccination is to enable immoral behaviors. In the very long term, it is possible that vaccination might be an impediment to the robustness of the species, but that is a particularly-controversial argument, and seems to disregard the value of currently-living persons.

This is a complex problem. The rational, moral choice in common human circumstances isn't always as obvious as people make it out to be. We can (and frequently do) get ourselves into situations where there isn't a single, clear moral option, but a variety of choices, each with its own complications. In the end, one thing to be wary of in matters such as these is really anyone who claims that his position is the only, self-evident, sensible one.

So where do I stand personally in all of this? I generally avoid medications unless an illness is so bad that I can't sleep. I don't think I've had any vaccinations since I was about 8 -- at least I don't remember any. If there was a deadly disease ripping through the population, if I got a nasty puncture wound, or was bitten by an animal, I'd go get vaccinated. Otherwise, for diseases where there is little chance of infection, or if the consequences are generally mild, I avoid vaccination. I would not attempt to impose my opinions or choices on anyone else, especially via the threat of force (via the state).

Of course, I'll probably be dead next week from a unique combination of yellow fever, malaria and emotional constipation, at which point Mark Shea can triumphantly declare, "I told you so!" No doubt the epitaph will read, "And this is why you should get your shots."